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Abstract
This paper focuses on how deterrence and humanitarianism were conceptualized by politicians in
terms of policy initiatives and solutions within discourses around the 2014 US “migrant crisis.”
Analyzing how deterrence and humanitarianism were understood by politicians during the 2014
crisis served as a case study in order to better comprehend how nations define terms that impact
policy options and decision making on an issue that is connected to international law and human
rights, along with how international ideas and terms, like humanitarianism, are defined at a
national level. The results of this analysis illustrate that the two seemingly distinct frameworks of
deterrence and humanitarianism were defined in ways that allowed for them to coexist and, in
some cases, mutually support the same policy initiatives advocated by politicians. The ways
these terms were defined were also based on how politicians viewed the migrants and asylum
seekers arriving at the US-Mexico border and their reasons for migrating. This supports the view
that nations define and shape issues of international concern and international principles to fit
their national context, which brings into question the ability for international law to be
“universal.” These findings also carry important implications for how the US government reacts
and responds to migrants and asylum seekers after the 2014 crisis. However, further research is
needed to analyze how deterrence and humanitarianism were conceptualized in other areas of US
society, and if these terms were still able to coexist outside of government discourses.
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Introduction
The 2014 “migrant crisis”1 in the United States (US) was arguably the first major crisis in
the US that brought a focus to unaccompanied children and families seeking asylum from
Central American countries. The migrant crisis received intense interest from the American
public and politicians in the spring and summer of 2014, although the increase was part of a
greater, increasing trend in unaccompanied children and families arriving at the US-Mexico
border since 2011 (Lind 2014). In Fiscal Year 2014 (October 2013-September 2014), there was a
77 percent increase in the number of children arriving at the border compared to the previous
fiscal year, with 68,541 children apprehended during that time; 68,445 family units were
apprehended as well (Lind 2014). Regarding the demographics of the children and families
arriving at the border, “75% of unaccompanied children, and 90% of family unit arrivals were
from Central America” (Chishti and Hipsman 2015, 96). Due to the large number of
unaccompanied children, Border Patrol did not process them within the 72-hour timeframe that
the law requires, and would sometimes place children in temporary holding spaces on military
bases (Lind 2014). According to reporters who were given access to these holding spaces, they
described the areas as being in overall good conditions, but still traumatic for the children (Lind
2014).
A combination of strong “push” and “pull” factors were labeled as possible causes which
led to the development of this perceived crisis. Push factors are issues that push individuals to
migrate to another area or leave their country of origin, while pull factors are issues that draw
1

Even though I will use this term throughout the paper, it is important to acknowledge the implications of the term
“crisis”. In “The Human Rights of Unaccompanied Minors in the USA from Central America,” Androff (2016)
states “The term crisis has negative connotations and implications that should be avoided, mainly because it risks
hyperbole, problematized the migrants, and adds a sensational flavor to the phenomenon which also risks inculcating
historical amnesia, obscuring long-term dynamics and trends at work. However, it is also useful for its brevity and
for lack of better language” (71). This term will be used throughout the paper for lack of a better way of describing
the phenomenon without diminishing its implications and the importance of the journey for the migrants.
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people towards migrating to a particular area. Some of the major push factors identified included
issues of economic insecurity, poverty, and increasing levels of violence in the countries of
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (countries from which the majority of children and
families were coming from) (Chishti and Hipsman 2015, 97; Negroponte 2014). In the early
2010s, these countries had some of the highest murder rates in the world, with Honduras having
the highest murder rate of any country in the world in 2014 (Lind 2014). Pull factors included a
desire to reunite with family members in the US, greater economic opportunities, and widespread
misperception of US immigration policies (Chishti and Hipsman 2015, 97-98; Negroponte
2014). Regarding migrants’ being misinformed about US immigration policies, many argued that
smuggling networks (which are an important component of a successful journey to the US) were
spreading false information to migrants about immigration policy and a person’s ability to stay
legally in the country (Chishti and Hipsman 2015, 100). A significant number of American
politicians believed that this misinformation was also due to the “generous” treatment US law
provides to unaccompanied children, and the administration’s immigration policies like Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and increased prosecutorial discretion in immigration
proceedings (Lind 2014). It was argued that these policies made it appear like the US was not
deporting children and families, and would allow for them to stay legally.
When looking at the overall government response to the migrant crisis, the Obama
administration did not respond to this issue until the summer, even though the number of
unaccompanied children and families arriving at the border had been quickly increasing since the
spring (Chishti and Hipsman 2015, 102). They initially framed the historic number of people
seeking asylum at the border as a humanitarian crisis, but quickly decided that they needed to
figure out a long-term approach to “deter” more people from coming to the US (Chishti and

5

Hipsman 2015, 103). By July, the administration began to publicize that most people who arrived
in the US during this time would not qualify for humanitarian relief and would be deported, and
in August announced that they would be fast-tracking court dates with immigration judges to
speed up the process (Chishti and Hipsman 2015, 103). They also implemented a program that
would legally allow for minors to be paroled into the US to be reunited with parents who were
considered lawfully present in the country (Chishti and Hipsman 2015, 104). After August, the
number of unaccompanied children and families arriving at the border sharply decreased, which
arguably showed that the tough stance taken on by the Obama administration might have actually
deterred individuals from deciding to migrate to the US.
Even though the Obama administration ultimately focused on implementing policies that
would supposedly deter individuals from making the journey (either directly or indirectly) while
also focusing on foreign policy initiatives, there were many other policies proposed as well under
the umbrella of a humanitarian response. The various points of view brought up during the 2014
migrant crisis, and the different push and pull factors discussed, explored different policy
responses to the issue. For example, in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing titled
“Department of Homeland Security Oversight” on June 11, 2014, Republicans advocated for
stricter enforcement of immigration laws and an increase in deportations to send a message that
would deter individuals from making the journey to the US; Democrats focused more on the
“root causes” of violence and poverty to make the case for greater regional cooperation and
emphasized the importance of treating children fairly throughout their immigration proceedings
(Senate Judiciary 2014). This particular example is representative of the greater issues debated
around how to best resolve the situation, specifically how the US could balance the
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responsibilities that come with a humanitarian issue and the politics of border security,
immigration control, and deterrence.
This paper aims to investigate the following questions: How are deterrence and
humanitarian responses defined and understood in the context of the 2014 migrant crisis by
government officials? And, can these two frameworks be considered mutually exclusive from
one another? In order to better address these research questions, another question that drove this
project was the following: How do politicians’ views of children and families factor into how
these frameworks were defined when talking about the 2014 crisis? Humanitarianism and
deterrence are two major frameworks that, in the context of the US, shape US asylum politics
and have connections to the greater immigration debate (Hamlin 2012, 52). These two
frameworks are assumed to be distinct ways of viewing immigration and asylum politics.
Although, through a closer examination of the discourse in the 2014 migrant crisis, this does not
necessarily seem to be the case.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the way that deterrence and humanitarianism were
conceptualized and defined in the 2014 migrant crisis was dependent on the way that the
migrants and asylum seekers arriving at the border were viewed and what their motivations for
migration were understood to be. Deterrence and humanitarianism were also defined in ways that
allowed for them to complement each other, with deterrence being viewed as either the
immediate or long term goal in order to stop migrants from arriving at the border, and
humanitarianism as the way they should be treated within the broader deterrent policy initiatives
and how the perceived causes of the crisis should be resolved. There were some differences
between the legislative and executive branches in the extent to which the deterrence and
humanitarian frameworks overlapped when discussing the crisis, with the executive placing more
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emphasis on finding a balance between the two frameworks. However, in both government
branches, deterrence and humanitarianism were defined in ways that allowed for the frameworks
to coexist and support each other to a significant degree.
Exploring the discourse around deterrence and humanitarianism within the 2014 migrant
crisis has important implications for understanding how similar crises in the future are
understood, along with further exploring how international law and norms regarding asylum and
refugee politics are interpreted and defined in a national context. The Biden administration is
currently dealing with a record number of unaccompanied children being encountered and
apprehended at the border (Spagat and Jaffe 2021). With the 2014 migrant crisis being the first
time in which issues of unaccompanied children and families seeking asylum in the US gathered
mass attention in the post-Cold War era, the ways in which deterrence and humanitarian
responses were defined and the policy proposals that were a product of those discourses can help
in understanding the different responses and discourses deployed in similar events after 2014.
Also, this research is a case study about how a nation defines humanitarianism and deterrence,
and the implications of these discourses on policy options and decision making on an issue that is
connected to international law and human rights. It can further contribute to existing literature
regarding how the terms used at an international level are defined and applied based on
understandings developed at the national level, adding on to questions around international law’s
ability to be “universal” (Nash 2009; Posner 2017; Nash 2012).
Deterrence, Humanitarianism, and Central American Asylum Seekers
Before going in depth about how deterrence and humanitarianism were conceptualized
during the 2014 migration crisis, it is important to first establish a baseline understanding of what
these terms mean in relation to US asylum policy. A brief discussion of the history of Central
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American asylum seekers in the US is also necessary to anchor the 2014 migrant crisis in
historical context that is relevant to the treatment and perceptions around this particular migrant
demographic. Issues around whether Central Americans are “genuine refugees” have their roots
in the debates from the 1980s regarding Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers, and are still
visible in modern times. During the crisis, the UNHCR conducted a study titled Children on the
Run which found that, based on 404 interviews with unaccompanied children who arrived at the
border since October 2011, 58% of unaccompanied children potentially needed international
protection either through asylum or other humanitarian relief programs (UNHCR Children
2014). There was also a significant rise in the number of asylum claims at the border during this
time from adults and families (House Judiciary July 2014, pgs. 11, 30), indicating that the
migrant crisis was also an issue of asylum and protection needs.
Deterrence and Humanitarianism in the Context of Asylum
In the US, the history of asylum policy and politics has been shaped by three major
forces: Cold War and foreign policy concerns, alignment with international law (humanitarian
concerns), and the regime of deterrence (Hamlin 2012). Initially, asylum policy was attached to
refugee policy, which itself was shaped by the Cold War and was seen as separate from
immigration policy (Hamlin 2012, 34, 40-41). US refugee policy fully developed out of the
Second World War, and was viewed as a way to advance “the concept of protecting freedom and
stopping the spread of communism” (Hamlin 2012, 40). Asylum policy was shaped by similar
concerns around the US's ability to combat communism, and was especially important in the
cases of Cuban asylum seekers throughout the Cold War (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 69;
Hamlin 2012, 40-41). Asylum seekers and refugees from communist countries were viewed as
exemplifying the superiority of Western liberal democracy, and the failures of the Soviet Union
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and communism in providing for their citizens (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, xvii-xviii; Hamlin
2015, 322-323). Throughout this period, a double standard appeared in asylum policy, with
Cuban asylum seekers being broadly accepted into the country and Haitian asylum seekers being
systematically rejected (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 80-82).
Even though the 1980 Refugee Act (which officially promised a systematic process for
determining refugee status in asylum claims) can be seen as a turning point in the development
of asylum policy, the ideological drivers shaping the treatment of asylum seekers and the refugee
status determination process were not replaced until after the Cold War (Hamlin 2012, 43-44;
Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 189-190). With the end of the Cold War and US success, there was
no longer an ideological defense or foreign policy motive for accepting refugees and asylum
seekers. During the 1990s, however, different groups came together to fight for “asylum policy
consistent with international legal guidance” (Hamlin 2012, 46). Various advocacy groups
attacked the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agency (the department in charge of
immigration, refugee, and asylum policy implementation up until 2003) for the double standard
that had developed throughout the Cold War, and qualified the INS’s implementation of asylum
policies as a great failure (Hamlin 2012, 46). As a result of these strong criticisms, the INS
reformed the asylum program to make it more consistent with international standards, including
the establishment of an Asylum Corps where individuals would be trained in international law
and standards in order to determine refugee status (Hamlin 2012, 46). Overall, the persistent
advocacy and reforms implemented by the INS in the early 1990s represent the time period in
which humanitarianism, which was connected to alignment with international law, shaped US
asylum policy.
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Asylum policy was incorporated into the greater realm of immigration policy and the
deterrence regime in the late 1990s, not long after the INS implemented its humanitarian
reforms. During the 1990s, there was an “asylum boom” which placed significant strain on the
asylum system that, due to the reforms, would take a longer time in making decisions on
individual asylum claims (Hamlin 2012, 46; Hamlin 2015, 332). This significant increase in
asylum seekers and the administrative costs associated with the increase also coincided with “the
restrictionist political movement that had dominated American immigration politics in the 1980s
and was gaining momentum in the 1990s” (Hamlin 2012, 47). Asylum policy became officially
connected to immigration policy with the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsbility Act (IIRIRA), which was aimed at developing greater control over illegal
migration (Hamlin 2012, 49). Regarding asylum policy, IIRIRA placed greater emphasis on
“reducing potential incentives” through stricter deadlines and procedures for applying for
asylum, along with attacking fraudulent claims (Hamlin 2012, 49-50). One reform that limited
individual access to the asylum process was expedited removal, which left the decision of
continuing with the asylum process up to a Border Patrol agent who had to determine whether an
individual had a “credible fear” of persecution (Hamlin 2012, 50). In the realm of asylum policy,
the regime of deterrence has manifested into a stricter process with the goal of pushing out those
viewed as “nonrefugees” more quickly, and deterring people from abusing the system and
staying in the country.
The asylum process up to modern day has continued to be mainly shaped by the
deterrence regime, although humanitarianism is still present in the politics of asylum. For
example, the 2005 REAL ID Act has made it more difficult for individuals to obtain asylum by
raising the burden of proof in regards to the evidence that needs to be presented by the asylum
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seeker to prove their fear of persecution (Hamlin 2014, 81; AILA Doc. No. 1 7052435 2017).
This would push more individuals into the deportation process and further narrow who could be
categorized as a “genuine refugee,” which falls in line with the goal of stricter immigration
control in the regime of deterrence. However, in her analysis of the changes in asylum policy in
US history, Rebecca Hamlin (2012) states “today humanitarianism competes not with a war on
communism, but with the powerful and enduring idea that States have a right to make
immigration and border control policy to their own national interests” (52). Humanitarianism can
still be seen in the fact that the US still has an individualized refugee status determination
process based on the international definition of a refugee, and that access to the asylum process
has not necessarily been completely destroyed (Hamlin 2012, 52). Overall, two seemingly
contradictory frameworks focusing on border and/or immigration control (deterrence), and
alignment with international refugee law (humanitarianism) continue to shape US asylum policy
today.
(Very) Brief History of Central American Asylum Seekers in the US
The first time the US visibly had to respond to Central American migrants and asylum
seekers was during the 1970s and 1980s, in which many Central American states were dealing
with violent civil conflict. Since this occurred towards the end of the Cold War, the US
responded to this group of asylum seekers on ideological, anti-communist lines (Loescher and
Scanlan 1986, 171). Many Central American countries during this time period were dealing with
civil conflict between US-backed anticommunist forces and communist movements (Williams,
Peace, and Kuzmarov 2018). Many of the forces supported by the US were the official
governments of the Central American countries, including those of El Salvador and Guatemala,
and state forces were involved in many atrocities (Williams, Peace, and Kuzmarov 2018). One
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example is the 1981 El Mozote massacre, in which the Salvadoran army assassinated almost
1,000 men, women, and children in the El Mozote village (Williams, Peace, and Kuzmarov
2018). Many Central American asylum seekers arriving in the US in the 1970s and 1980s were
fleeing political violence from the various groups involved in the conflicts, including state forces
(Williams, Peace, and Kuzmarov 2018). Due to the fact that Central American asylum seekers
were not fleeing Communist regimes, their asylum applications were systematically denied
(Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 170, 193). For example, in 1980, the same year that the Salvadoran
Civil War officially started, no Salvadoran applicants had their asylum petitions granted
(Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 172).
Although there were some successes in fighting against the government’s systematic
rejection of Central American asylum seekers at the judicial level, Cold War politics was still the
most significant factor in determining asylum claims through the 1980s (Hamlin 2012, 45). The
Reagan administration held the view that “only those fleeing Communist countries ordinarily
would be able to show the requisite fear of persecution” (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 191). This
view ended up shaping the administration’s double standard response to asylum seekers, in
which those who were not fleeing a Communist regime were portrayed as “illegal immigrants”
(Hamlin 2012, 45). For example, “In defending the high rejection rates for Salvadorans in the
1980s, INS spokesperson Duke Austin said ‘If all they wanted to do is flee violence, they would
have stayed in Mexico’...” (Hamlin 2012, 45). Portraying Central American asylum seekers as
undocumented immigrants by questioning their decision to make the trip to the US continues to
appear in discourses around Central American migrants up to today, and is very prevalent in the
discourse around the 2014 migrant crisis (House Foreign Affairs 2014, 6-8; House Homeland
Security 2014, 9-10). Also, questions about Central American asylum seekers qualifying as
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“genuine refugees” due to security and economic issues are still being considered today, and are
central in discussions during the 2014 migrant crisis (House Judiciary June 2014, 156-157;
Senate Foreign Relations 2014, 8). Overall, seeing how the US government has responded to
Central American asylum seekers in the 1970s and 1980s, and how many of the same questions
and issues are brought up in the present day for the same demographic, helps further
contextualize the 2014 migrant crisis and the discourse around the migrants in particular.
Literature Review
An analysis of the 2014 migrant crisis touches on the broader issues of asylum and state
sovereignty, international law’s influence on national politics, and national interpretations of
international laws and norms. This is a case study of how a state defines terms that are utilized to
address situations that are connected to international law and human rights, and addresses how
an international principle like humanitarianism comes to be defined at the domestic level. There
is existing literature on the issue of how a state interprets and shapes international principles to
fit its national context (Posner 2017; Lupu and Wallace 2019; Stenner 2011; Nash 2009).
However, this area of academic literature is contested by scholars who argue that international
law itself can affect domestic populations’ views on issues of international concern (Strezhnev,
Simmons, and Kim 2019; Putnam and Shapiro 2017; Simmons 2017). This tension in existing
literature around the influence of international law is exemplified in the debate around human
rights and state sovereignty, in which human rights (including asylum) brings into question the
compatibility between the responsibility states have towards vulnerable populations
internationally and their right as sovereign states to control their borders (Fabri 2008, Joppke
1997, Barnett 2001). In the rest of this section, these three themes will be discussed in more
detail.
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Asylum and State Sovereignty
The process of asylum touches on issues of migration politics, border control, and
international responsibility, since it is the process an individual goes through in the country they
arrive in to determine whether they qualify for international protection as a refugee (UNHCR
Asylum-Seekers n.d.). Asylum as a human right is enshrined in the UN’s Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, stating that “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution” (UN Human Rights 1948). However, the international community has
made a clear distinction between what that right means for individuals and for states. Individuals
have a right to seek asylum, which means that they are entitled to leaving their country and
applying for protection in another country. States, on the other hand, have no inherent obligation
to grant that protection (UN Declaration Asylum 1967). Due to this distinction, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees has published multiple documents throughout the years outlining
best practices and suggestions for how a state should go about determining asylum claims and
how to treat asylum seekers in a way that respects their human rights (UNHCR Handbook 2011;
UNHCR Alternatives to Detention 2012).
Since states have the right to grant asylum, and individuals the right to seek it, it brings in
questions about states’ obligations to asylum seekers and how states should strike a balance
between their sovereign right to control their borders and international obligations towards those
fleeing persecution. Border control factors in through the fact that asylum seekers are physically
arriving at a state’s borders, rather than being resettled as an already legally established refugee.
According to Christian Joppke, since border and immigration control are also intimately
connected to the identity boundaries of a nation-state, asylum seekers also push the boundaries of
national identity, especially in Western liberal democracies (Joppke 1997, 260-261). This makes
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the decision of accepting asylum seekers even more complex, since liberal nation-states want to
be seen as respecting human rights but also want to “[protect] integrity of the people from which
their sovereignty derives” (Joppke 1997, 261).
States’ increasingly restrictionist stances on asylum and refugee policies have also
pushed international organizations to focus on the states that individuals are fleeing from, with
the assumption that “the prospect of long-term protection is ‘home’...” (Barnett 2001, 246). This
brings into question whose sovereignty is seen as being in tension with asylum and refugee
policy, since that line of work has pushed international organizations into the domestic politics of
the states individuals are fleeing from (Barnett 2001, 249-254). However, human rights in
general have impacted how sovereignty is defined and enacted. In “Human Rights and State
Sovereignty: Have the Boundaries Been Significantly Redrawn?”, Fabri mentions that state
sovereignty includes a “state’s absolute right to determine the fate of its own nationals” (2008,
39). However, this is contested by international human rights, which say that there are certain
norms states have to follow regarding treatment of their citizens (Fabri 2008, 39). Even with
these changes, Fabri argues that human rights are only able to be protected at the national level
where there are varying levels of compliance based on the different control mechanisms in place
pushing states to comply with human rights (2008, 52-60). Overall, existing literature
acknowledges that state sovereignty is in tension with asylum and human rights generally, and
explores the different ways this tension manifests in domestic and international politics.
However, this literature does not address how ideas of sovereignty and international obligations
can be understood differently within nations.
International Influence on Domestic Populations

16

There is a growing area of academic research which addresses the potential influence that
international law and principles can have on individuals’ opinions and their understanding of
issues that touch both the domestic and international spheres (Strezhnev et al. 2019; Putnam and
Shapiro 2017; Kim 2019). Some of this research has drawn on an experimental research design
to determine a potential causal relationship between international law and domestic public and/or
elite opinions on complying with international law (Strezhnev et al. 2019; Putnam and Shapiro
2017; Kim 2019). For example, in “Rulers or Rules? International Law, Elite Cues, and Public
Opinion,” Strezhnev, Simmons, and Kim (2019) found that for the countries studied (including
the US) international law did have a small but statistically significant impact on respondents’
support for refugee policies that go against international law (1300). Regarding the US, the
authors found that “there was significant evidence that respondents were, on average, more likely
to oppose nationality-based restrictions when exposed to the law treatment [exposing
respondents to international law requirements towards refugees]...” (Strezhnev et al. 2019, 1294).
However, the authors also note that for the US, the president’s party identification also affected
whether a president’s endorsement of a restrictive refugee policy had an effect on a respondent’s
opinion towards that policy (if they were of the same party as the president) (Strezhnev et al.
2019, 1294-1295). This implies that other factors outside of exposure to international law can
have greater influence on people’s understanding and opinions around issues of international
concern. Overall, though, the article shows that exposure to international law and principles in
itself can have some significant effects on individuals’ opinions towards domestic policies that
might go against international law.
International law can also shape US public opinion on foreign policy decisions around
human rights enforcement. In the article “International Law and Voter Preferences: The Case of
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Foreign Human Rights Violations,” Putnam and Shapiro argue that international law does have
an influence on public opinion around human rights enforcement abroad, but that it is predicated
on whether the country’s foreign policy interests align with enforcing human rights in a certain
nation (Putnam and Shapiro 2017, 253-255). Even when respondents are told that the foreign
policy issue under question violated international law, US interests still played a significant role
in whether sample respondents supported or opposed human rights enforcement abroad (Putnam
and Shapiro 2017, 253). The conditionality that Putnam and Shapiro found in their experimental,
quantitative study is similar to Strezhnev, Simmons, and Kim’s finding that, in the US, factors
like a president’s party identification can have a stronger influence than exposure to international
law in shaping public opinion towards restrictive refugee policies (Strezhnev et al. 2019,
1294-1295). However, influence of international law on public opinion does strengthen when
states demonstrate a high level of commitment or sense of legal obligation in complying with
international law, at least in the area of sanctioning transnational corporations for human rights
violations (Kim 2019, 426-427). Overall, the literature illustrates that international law can
influence domestic public opinion, but that the influence is in many cases conditional on other
domestic factors that play a role in the extent to which public opinion agrees on states complying
with international law, which indicates the importance of national understandings around issues
of international concern.
International Law and Principles as “Nation-Specific”
Not only is the influence of international law in the domestic sphere impacted by specific
domestic factors, but it is shaped by the ways in which international law is interpreted
domestically in terms of applying to a state’s jurisdiction, context, etc. As displayed in the
previous section, the relationship between international law’s influence, domestic public opinion,
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and state compliance with international law is complex. However, existing literature on the ways
in which international law is subject to national interpretations emphasizes that each state lives in
a particular context in which the international sphere plays only a small role in the production
and implementation of domestic and foreign policy. For example, in “Liberal Internationalism
and the Populist Backlash,” Posner argues that the waves of populist backlash globally have
turned against international law and institutions since it is seen as only benefiting global elites
(Posner 2017, 795). Even though specific populist movements vary in their goals and
development, a common theme highlighted by the author is that populist movements attack
“elites” or the “establishment” because they are seen as not representative of the people (Posner
2017, 796). The populist view of international law and institutions challenges the assumption
that the international sphere is expanding its influence in the domestic sphere, and shows how
domestic perceptions of the international sphere can limit the influence of international law.
Context continues to be important in understanding the limited influence of international
law, including events that could be occurring within a country at that time. In Lupu and
Wallace’s article (2019) titled “Violence, Nonviolence, and the Effects of International Human
Rights Law,” the authors found overall that concerns about protection from violent opposition
groups is consistently more important than whether certain human rights abuses are illegal under
international law (423). They also found that the ability for international human rights law to
reduce public support for human rights abuses varied by national context (Lupu and Wallace
2019, 423). This illustrates how domestic issues can limit international influence due to what is
prioritized in a particular time, along with suggesting that international law’s influence in general
varies by nation. Variation of international law’s influence on national opinion aligns with the
view that there are at least four distinct ways human rights are understood especially for
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non-experts (Stenner 2011, 1215). These four ways of understanding human rights are expected,
especially since human rights exist “In a context where there is no agreed unitary expert position
on what human rights really are…” (Stenner 2011, 1221). Overall, this illustrates how the
influence international law has in a domestic context varies based on how the law, and the
principles underlying it, are understood and whether it can be applicable in a particular context.
In thinking about the different ways international law can be defined through the issue of
human rights, Kate Nash presents “human rights culture” as something that needs to be
questioned and further analyzed at a national level, since it is “only through states that human
rights can be realized” (Nash 2009, 3). In her book Cultural Politics, Nash points out that human
rights are not only deployed within a state’s institutions and procedures with a clear end point,
but are continuously defined inside and outside of those procedures (2009, 9). One of the reasons
why human rights can be negotiated at the domestic and international levels is because of it
being an “intermistic” field, which means human rights are “both international and domestic at
the same time” (Nash 2009, 14). For Nash, this status as intermistic and the definition of human
rights at these two levels raises the following questions: “Are we living in a period in which
definitions of human rights are being progressively expanded? If not, how is it that human rights,
which appear to derive their legitimacy from international consensus on their content and form,
are altered, and narrowed, as they become matters of concrete conflict within particular states?”
(Nash 2009, 16). In applying these concerns to the 2014 migrant crisis, questions arise as well
regarding how national understandings around humanitarian responsibility, and what policies
should dominate in immigration politics, lead to specific initiatives dealing with issues of
international concern.
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In this book, Nash continues on to argue that there are four main areas in which human
rights are defined and contested, with the goal of gaining authority over what human rights mean
in practice (Nash 2009, 31-32). The four main areas are the juridical, governmental, activist, and
mediated public subfields (Nash 2009, 32). Since this paper focuses particularly on how the
terms deterrence and humanitarianism were defined by the executive and legislative branches
during the 2014 migrant crisis, it is important to mention Nash’s discussion of the governmental
subfield in defining human rights. The governmental subfield is “engaged wherever there are
struggles involving government officials, whose objective positions give them the possibility of
making effective decisions, whether in their own states or in international governmental
organizations” (Nash 2009, 41). The governmental subfield has power over two main areas in
defining human rights: the power to settle disputes and ratification of human rights conventions,
and their authority in deciding the extent to which government policy should conform to
international law (Nash 2009, 41). However, the government is also involved in contesting
human rights law to varying degrees in secrecy, in domestic courts, and within the government
itself between state officials (Nash 2009, 41). The government’s authority to decide the extent to
which policy should ignore or conform to international law (either explicitly or implicitly)
illustrates the significant power the governmental subfield has in defining terms and principles to
respond to specific contexts, and the power to implement those responses.
Nash goes on to conclude by discussing the possibilities of intermistic human rights in
creating a world where individual human rights can be understood in similar ways across the
board, and what that would require from nations. For Nash, intermistic human rights are based
on the assumption that it is not only citizens who are entitled to certain rights, but individual
human beings (Nash 2009, 184). Although the author sees no inherent contradiction between
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national and international human rights law, she also acknowledges that states can begin to
incorporate international human rights law similarly if citizens push their government officials to
be accountable to “humanity” rather than just the citizenry (Nash 2009, 182). Until then,
however, human rights will most likely continue to be defined and applied in ways that satisfy
national concerns and understandings of human rights. This is important to take into account
when analyzing issues like immigration and asylum, where discussions of how to treat
non-citizens and what rights they might have in a state that is not their country of citizenship is
central in how states end up responding to those issues. This is very much state-specific, as seen
with the human rights field as presented by Nash, which is why it is important to study how
national discourses on issues that touch on international laws and principles end up shaping how
the issues are understood and responded to.
Research Design
In order to understand how a nation goes about conceptualizing terms that shape a
nation’s response to issues that are of international importance in the realm of refugee and
asylum policy, I will use the 2014 migrant crisis in the US as a case study, particularly analyzing
how deterrence and humanitarianism were defined and conceptualized in terms of policy
initiatives during the crisis. A single case study will allow for me to gather rich information on a
specific migrant crisis involving a significant number of individuals seeking protection or
asylum, and how that is contextualized and understood in the US. Analyzing the 2014 migrant
crisis can give us insight into the role of language and discourse in the governmental field when
dealing with issues that connect to international obligations towards refugees and asylum
seekers. Also, since the 2014 migrant crisis is arguably the first, most visible post-Cold War
crisis the US had to deal with regarding Central American asylum seekers, understanding how
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humanitarianism and deterrence are conceptualized throughout this time can help us build a
baseline to understand later responses to a rise in Central American migrants arriving at the
border.
In this case study, the focus will be particularly on the response to Central American
children and families arriving at the border between May and August of 2014. It is important to
acknowledge that, even though Central American children and families made up a large majority
of the people arriving at the US-Mexico border, there were also Mexican children and families,
and adults from various countries arriving at the border during this time as well (Lind 2014).
However, the 2014 migrant crisis was defined by the unprecedented number of unaccompanied
children and families, particularly from Central America, who were arriving at the border (Lind
2014). The time period from which data was collected for this project was between May 1st and
August 31st of 2014, since it encompasses the beginning and the height of focus on the issues by
politicians and the American public, and it was during this time that the government’s response
was forming. Even though the crisis technically began in 2011, the number of migrants steadily
increased and reached record levels in 2014, particularly between May and August. Also, the
number of migrants arriving at the border quickly decreased by August 2014 (Chishti and
Hipster 2015, 104).
In order to get a detailed understanding of how the government conceptualized
humanitarianism and deterrence, and how politicians viewed the migrants arriving at the border,
documents from the executive and legislative branches were analyzed. Regarding the legislative
branch, Congressional committee hearing transcripts which focused on oversight of immigration
agencies during the crisis, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the US
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) agency, or on Central American policy in general
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were chosen. In total, nine committee hearings were analyzed. Congressional committee hearings
showcase more nuanced discussions of issues from Congressmembers who are considered
experts in those policy fields and/or build expertise in those policy fields through their work on
the committees (Kernell 2020, 265-267). Also, committees are where specific legislation
proposals and policy initiatives are tested, and reflect their ability to pass in the greater House of
Representatives’ and Senate floors (although this is more important in the House than the Senate)
(Kernell 2020, 277-278). Within the committee hearing transcripts, attention was dedicated
mostly to opening statements, government witness statements, and the question and answer
portion of the hearings in order to focus mostly on politicians’ understanding of the issue and
how they defined the terms of concern.
Regarding the executive branch, executive press releases and press briefings were
analyzed. Press briefings and releases/statements were chosen because they show how the
president views the issue and potential solutions in a way that can be understood by the general
public. These pieces would also focus on what the executive branch views as the most important
parts of the issues, since during the press briefings the press secretary is under a time constraint
to answer questions, and press releases are not very long and represent the most important parts
of the president’s message. For press briefings, one press briefing was read for every seven days,
starting from May 1st and ending before or on August 31st. For press releases, all statements and
releases connected to Central America, the 2014 migrant crisis, border security, and
unaccompanied children released between May 1st and August 31st were analyzed.
For both Congress and the executive branch, I analyzed how deterrence and
humanitarianism were discussed and in what contexts. Also, I looked into how children and
families were discussed, particularly in terms of why they decided to migrate to the US and if
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they presented a “threat” to border or national security. The main questions guiding this
discourse analysis are the following:
●

Why did politicians decide on a deterrence or humanitarian approach to the issue? What were the
explanations for the different solutions being proposed? (Did these explanations vary by party?)

●

How were the children and families perceived by politicians? What were understood as the main
drivers for their migration?

●

What were defined as “good” and “bad” policy responses to the crisis? What were the
explanations behind what was “good” or “bad”?

These questions were aimed at focusing my analysis on how deterrence and humanitarianism
were defined and understood by the politicians involved in discourse around the 2014 migrant
crisis. They were formed out of initial readings of the data, and were used to further structure my
data collection process.
Data Analysis
Overall, based on the data collected, the ways in which deterrence and humanitarianism
were conceptualized by government officials during the 2014 migrant crisis were dependent on
how politicians viewed the migrants and asylum seekers arriving at the border, and what factors
politicians deemed to be most important in motivating individuals to flee or migrate. These
definitions complemented each other to varying degrees. For politicians who viewed the violence
and economic conditions in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras as the main factor driving the
crisis, they viewed deterrence as a long-term goal that could be achieved through regional
cooperation and economic assistance. Humanitarianism was defined as the way that the US
should treat children and families, along with making sure each individual had complete access
to the immigration court system to present their asylum or protection cases, thus following
international law and respecting asylum seekers’ right to seek asylum.
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For politicians who viewed misinformation, lack of enforcement of immigration laws,
and/or assumed that migrants believed they could stay indefinitely as the main factors driving the
crisis, deterrence and humanitarianism were defined by strict immigration enforcement and mass
deportation responses that would allow for the US to act “compassionately” (Senate Homeland
2014, 55). This was because the quick deportation of newly arrived migrants and asylum seekers
would theoretically send a message to others seeking to migrate that they would not be allowed
to stay in the US. Stopping migrants and asylum seekers, especially unaccompanied children,
from making the journey to the US was seen as compassionate because it would potentially save
individuals from the dangers they expose themselves to when trying to get to the US. In both
cases, one can see how deterrence and humanitarianism are conceptualized in ways that allow for
these frameworks to coexist and support one another, and in some cases make the frameworks
seem indistinguishable from one another. The variations seen in the discourse around the 2014
migrant crisis within the US government illustrates the importance of how the state interprets and
defines terms that shape its response to issues of international concern, and how that can affect a
nation’s ability to align with international principles in its response to those issues (Nash 2009).
Migrants and asylum-seekers as driven out by countries’ conditions
When looking specifically at the ways in which politicians viewed the asylum seekers
and migrants arriving at the border, politicians focused mostly on either the push or pull factors
that motivated individuals to migrate, which influenced how they defined deterrence,
humanitarianism, and possible solutions to the issue. For those that focused on the push factors,
the main explanations given for individuals leaving the countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras were that these countries’ conditions in terms of economic instability and increased
violence pushed individuals to leave (House Judiciary May 2014, 87; Senate Judiciary 2014,
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13-14; House Foreign Affairs 2014, pgs. 8-9, 34; Senate Homeland 2014, 8-9; Senate Foreign
Relations 2014, 27-29; Fact Sheet Emergency 2014; Readout Vice President Central America
Call 2014; President Statement Immigration 2014). This focus on push factors was initially seen
during the House Judiciary Committee hearing on May 29 regarding the work of DHS. The DHS
Secretary mentioned in the question and answer portion of the hearing that one of the main
causes of the rise in unaccompanied children at the border were the violent situations in
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador (House Judiciary May 2014, 87).
As the number of migrants and asylum seekers arriving at the border continued to
increase, those who believed that the push factors were the main cause of the crisis continued to
emphasize the importance of those countries’ conditions. For example, in the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing on July 9, the Chairman of the committee
stated the following in his opening statement:
“Life in parts of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras is more than difficult today… Violence
has been steadily increasing in the region, with homicide rates in all three countries among the
highest in the entire world. Kidnapping and extortion are endemic. Meanwhile, these countries
have stagnant economies that create too few jobs and opportunities for their citizens. Faced with
this violence and lack of hope at home, people from the region are voting with their feet and
risking their lives on the nearly 1,500-mile journey to the United States” (2014, 8).

This statement proposes that the main factor for individuals migrating to the US were the
increasingly violent crime incidents that impacted a majority of the population, and people’s
inability to economically support themselves, which was a view proposed throughout the hearing
particularly by Democratic senators (Senate Homeland 2014). Similarly, throughout the duration
of the crisis, the executive branch also placed continued emphasis on addressing the “root
causes” of the crisis. Throughout the press statements the executive branch released, particularly
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those which discussed meetings between US and Central American political leaders, it was
repeatedly acknowledgement that the conditions in those countries needed to improve in order
for citizens to stay (Vice President Honduras Call 2014; Vice President Meetings Minors 2014;
Vice President Central American Calls 2014; President Statement Immigration 2014; Joint
Statement Presidents 2014).
However, the individuals who thought the main causes of the crisis were the economic
instability and insecurity these countries faced also acknowledged the importance of potential
pull factors, further displaying the complexity of this crisis. For example, even though the
executive branch did view addressing the “root causes” of the issue as vital to successfully
limiting the number of people seeking asylum or migrating to the US, they also focused heavily
on combating what they viewed as a “deliberate, misinformation campaign that is propagated by
criminal syndicates in Central America” (Press Briefing June 20 2014). This theme of
misinformation as a “root cause” in itself is also seen throughout multiple press statements that
reflected what was discussed between US and Central American political leaders (Vice President
Honduras Call 2014; Vice President Meeting Minors 2014; Vice President Central American
Calls 2014; President Statement Immigration 2014; Joint Statement Presidents 2014). In a joint
statement by the Presidents of the US, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador published on July
25, it was mentioned that the presidents agreed to put more effort in countering misinformation
on US immigration policy (Joint Statement Presidents 2014).
Similarly, in the legislative branch, politicians who believed the main cause were the
push factors of violence and poverty also acknowledged that there were other factors
significantly contributing to the crisis. For example, in Congressmember Sires’s opening
statement for the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on June 25 regarding child migration
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from Central America, he mentioned that Central American governments should do what they
could to fight against misinformation on US immigration policy (House Foreign Affairs 2014,
10). A few sentences afterwards, however, the Congressman stated that “Now more than ever,
the U.S. should support the region in a concerted regional strategic strategy to… undermine the
conditions that give way to gang and family-related violence” (House Foreign Affairs 2014, 11).
This illustrates how, even though other factors were acknowledged, politicians who focused on
the push factors of the crisis typically centered that in discussions about the migrants and asylum
seekers at the border.
Focusing on the conditions within Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras allowed for
those politicians to talk about the children arriving at the border as potential refugees, which in
turn shaped how they defined humanitarianism and deterrence. In the House Judiciary
Committee hearing on June 25 regarding the crisis, the Ranking Member of the committee
mentioned how people, particularly children, are fleeing the Central American countries because
of increasing violence in the region and are seeking protection (House Judiciary June 2014, 8).
He went on to describe the crisis as a test of the US’s ability to follow its laws while also
fulfilling its obligations towards people searching for protection (House Judiciary June 2014, 8).
In labeling the countries’ conditions as the main factor driving people’s migration, the
Congressman was able to see the asylum seekers and migrants arriving at the border as
vulnerable people who were fleeing their countries of origin because of violence and potential
persecution. Congressmembers who held this point of view were able to further support their
arguments with the Children on the Run study published by the UNHCR (House Judiciary June
2014, 12; Senate Foreign Relations 2014, 32). Since the ability to gain asylum or some form of
humanitarian protection is based on whether an individual is forced to flee for their own safety,
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focusing on the dangerous conditions in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras allowed for
politicians who focused on the push factors to view the people arriving at the border as
vulnerable people who were seeking refuge.
With this view of children in particular as people who potentially qualified for protection,
these politicians viewed a humanitarian response to the crisis as treating children fairly and
securing their access to submitting protection claims in immigration proceedings. The treatment
of children was an important concern for almost all of the politicians involved in discussions
about the crisis. However, for the politicians who viewed the children as potentially needing
protection, the treatment of children not only included providing them with basic necessities and
having them in less restrictive conditions, but also included fair access to the immigration system
in order to submit their protection claims (House Judiciary June 2014, pgs. 13, 232; House
Homeland Security 2014, 88; Senate Homeland Security 2014, 291; Senate Appropriations 2014,
pgs. 58, 74-75; Senate Foreign Relations 2014, 5-7; House Judiciary July 2014, 57-59; Press Call
2014; Letter President Efforts 2014; President Statement Immigration 2014). In a Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing regarding the migrant crisis on
July 16, the chair took time at the beginning of his opening statement to stress the importance of
a humane response to the children arriving at the border, specifically one that “honors our
obligations under United States and international law…” (Senate Homeland 2014, 291).
Also, in a hearing from the Senate Appropriations Committee reviewing the President’s
request for emergency funding to address the crisis (July 10), a Senator stated the following: “We
[the US] routinely ask other countries to support refugees fleeing violence. Let’s uphold our own
law and tell us specifically how can we do that, and then we will look for the funding” (Senate
Appropriations 2014, 59). These statements illustrate how, for these politicians, a humanitarian
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response meant treating children and families in a way that was consistent with international law.
Securing access to submitting asylum and protection claims through existing US law was seen as
a way to fulfill US obligations towards these children and families. The existing system in the
country regarding how children should be treated when being processed and in immigration
proceedings was viewed by many of these politicians as also being a humanitarian response to
the crisis, since children were being treated compassionately and fairly through that system
(Senate Foreign Relations 2014, 5). Overall, when politicians viewed the children and families
arriving at the border as possibly having valid protection claims, humanitarianism was
understood to be the US securing people’s access to immigration courts and being able to submit
their protection claims in order to fulfill international obligations towards refugees and asylum
seekers.
However, as the crisis continued, politicians who viewed securing access to a fair
assessment of protection claims not only believed this was a humanitarian response to the crisis,
but also came to believe that it could act as a form of deterrence, which displays how
humanitarianism and deterrence can coexist and support each other. In committee hearings on the
crisis throughout July, even though there was an acknowledgement that the crisis could be
considered a “refugee crisis,” more individuals who viewed the push factors as the main cause of
the crisis also began to emphasize that many of the individuals arriving at the border would not
qualify for any form of protection (Senate Homeland Security 2014, 291-292; Senate
Appropriations 2014, pgs. 8, 14, 40, 48, 55; Senate Foreign Relations 2014, pgs. 7, 27; House
Judiciary July 2014, 7). In the Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on July 10, the same
senator who stated that the US had a responsibility to support the children arriving at the border
also stated that they did not believe all children qualified for protection (Senate Appropriations
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2014, 58). Although, since at least some of the children did qualify, this senator believed it was
the US’s responsibility to assess every claim to make sure those with genuine claims would gain
protection in the US, further showing how a humanitarian response meant following US and
international law when it came to children having a fair assessment of their claims (Senate
Appropriations 2014, 58-59).
In a hearing on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 17, we begin to see a
greater acceptance of the idea that most of the children arriving at the border would not qualify
for protection. For example, in the Chairman’s opening statement, they stress how dangerous
changing existing law could be to the due process rights of children seeking protection, but then
goes on to state “there will be many under the existing law who will be deported, who will not
have proven a credible case…” (Senate Foreign Relations 2014, 7). The chairman’s comment
shows how having fair access to the system will work in favor of both controlling the number of
people who are able to stay in the country while allowing for the US to fulfill its obligations
under international law. This is because the system can ideally distinguish between “credible”
refugees and those who have no valid claims to protection, which as insinuated by the previous
comments a significant number of people arriving at the border were assumed to not have valid
claims at this point in the crisis. Deterrence becomes a part of the system through the deportation
of those with “illegitimate” claims to protection, since they would not be allowed to stay in the
country. This is further supported by the ranking member’s statement in the House Judiciary
Committee hearing regarding oversight of the USCIS, where they mentioned how children
deserved a quicker process to have their protection claims decided on, and that those who are
determined to not have valid claims needed to be deported quickly (House Judiciary July 2014,
7).

32

The ability for the system to be a deterrence mechanism itself becomes clearer when
looking at the policy initiatives suggested by the executive branch, which are also built on the
belief that many of the individuals arriving at the border would not qualify for protection or relief
from deportation (Press Call 2014; Letter President Efforts 2014; President Statement
Immigration 2014; Readout Pena Nieto July 2014; Fact Sheet Molina 2014; Press Briefing June
20 2014). In a press briefing on June 20th, the press secretary agreed that the goal of increasing
the capacity and processing ability of immigration courts and procedural facilities was to get
people through more quickly and be able to deport a majority of individuals who would not
qualify for protection (Press Briefing June 20 2014). This was based on the view that “when
those cases call, as they do in many, many cases for the removal of these individuals back to their
home country, that that’s something that can be executed pretty efficiently and effectively” (Press
Briefing June 20 2014). The ability to determine a person’s status more quickly and subsequently
deport them was viewed as potentially sending a strong signal to others in the Central American
countries to not make the journey to the US because being able to stay was not guaranteed
(President Statement Immigration 2014). In the executive branch, one can see how a
humanitarian response of securing a migrant or asylum seeker’s ability to submit their protection
claim can also act as a deterrent based on the belief that a majority of people would be deported
once their case was processed. This illustrates how deterrence and humanitarian responses can
coincide and support one another in cases where the individuals arriving at the border were
viewed as vulnerable people being pushed out of their countries and were deserving of a humane
response.
For those focused on the push factors, deterrence was also most consistently defined by
the US’s ability to assist the countries in improving conditions for their citizens, which also
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allowed for deterrence and humanitarianism to coexist in this perspective (House Foreign Affairs
2014, pgs. 8-9, 11, 35; House Judiciary June 2014, 13; House Homeland Security 2014, 53;
Senate Homeland Security 2014, pgs. 8-9, 18, 293; Senate Foreign Relations 2014, 7). On June
25, the House Foreign Affairs committee held a hearing specifically on what the State
Department and other US institutions directed at international development could do to help
alleviate the issues of economic insecurity and violence in the three Central American countries
(House Foreign Affairs 2014). Although the hearing was overall directed towards issues of US
aid to Central America, there were still significant divisions between the politicians (mostly
Democrats) who believed that the main cause of the crisis were the conditions of the countries,
and others (mostly Republicans) who believed it was due to a lack of strict enforcement of
immigration law and the Obama administration’s immigration policies (House Foreign Affairs
2014).
Politicians who viewed the conditions as the main drivers for the crisis underscored the
need for the US to have a long-term goal of assisting in the region to improve the countries’
conditions. For example, the full committee ranking member for the House Foreign Affairs
committee mentioned that 61 House members sent a letter to the President strongly advocating
for greater investments in government initiatives that would tackle gang violence and economic
issues in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, along with increasing the funds for upcoming
Fiscal Year 2015 (House Foreign Affairs 2014, 5). Later on, another Congressmember also
emphasized the importance of investing in job creation and security networks that could come
out of an economic focus, since “if that [job creation and security networks] happens then we
don’t have to worry about, you know, people crossing our borders all the time” (House Foreign
Affairs 2014, 35). Here, one can see how investing long-term in economic and security initiatives
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were seen as a way to limit the number of people coming to the US since the causes of their
migration would ideally no longer exist, which was continuously advocated for in other, later
Congressional committee hearings (House Judiciary June 2014, 13; House Homeland Security
2014, 53; Senate Homeland Security 2014, pgs. 8-9, 18, 293; Senate Foreign Relations 2014, 7).
Foreign policy and aid is thus the main deterrent, which is able to coexist with the more
short-term humanitarian response of securing individuals’ ability to submit and have their
protection claims heard. Overall, from this perspective, deterrence and humanitarianism can act
together to effectively and humanely respond to the crisis, which illustrates how these two
frameworks are not necessarily mutually exclusive or inherently opposed to one another; they
can coexist and help achieve politicians’ goals based on how they are conceptualized.
Migrants and asylum-seekers as drawn towards the US
In turning towards the politicians who believed the main cause of the crisis could be
attributed to mostly pull factors, one can also see how deterrence and humanitarianism are
conceptualized in a way that allows for these terms to become inseparable in policy proposals.
For the politicians who focused on these factors (who were mostly Republicans but also included
the executive branch), the crisis was seen as a product of the Obama administration’s lack of
immigration enforcement and policy changes like DACA, which incentivized children and
families to make the journey believing that they would be able to stay in the country (Senate
Judiciary 2014, pgs. 8, 16, 22-24, 31; House Foreign Affairs 2014, pgs. 6, 35-36, House
Judiciary June 2014; House Homeland Security 2014, pgs. 6, 18, 23, 54, 105; Senate Homeland
Security 2014, pgs. 10, 24, 28, 42). There was also a more general assumption that people were
being incentivized to migrate to the US because of the belief that they could stay in the country
due to the immigration process (Senate Homeland Security 2014, 312; Senate Appropriations
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2014, 50). The emphasis on the administration’s lack of action in immigration enforcement was
mentioned early on in Congressional committee hearings, with the first mention of this being in
the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on oversight of DHS on June 11. In his opening
statement, ranking member Chuck Grassley stated the following:
“Children are being lured into these dire circumstances quite frankly by false promises… This is a
disaster made by the administration, and only the President can correct it by sending the signals
that these people should not be brought here and that the law is going to be enforced. In other
words, the President must take responsibility. Unfortunately, the administration does not seem to
be prepared. It has failed to propose any solutions that will prevent children from being put in this
situation in the future.” (Senate Judiciary 2014, 8).

This statement by the ranking member illustrates the belief that a significant number of
politicians in Congress had, in which the main cause of the crisis were the administration’s
policies and lack of strict enforcement, and that the responsibility in terms of solutions fell on the
administration itself.
There was also the belief that people were pulled to migrate to the US due to the
immigration process that migrants from Central America would go through, which to some
extent made it seem like people could stay in the country and which smugglers were assumed to
advertise to people in order to make a profit off of their journey. The specific issue that
politicians who focused on the pull factors were referring to was the processing of Central
American children. The 2008 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act expanded
protections for unaccompanied children who were not from Mexico or Canada (so-called
noncontiguous countries) by barring the government from expediting these children’s removal
(Hulse 2014). This made the processing of children by immigration agents and courts a lot
longer, since the children had to be transferred to the custody of the Department of Health and
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Human Services (HHS) and wait for their immigration hearing (Hulse 2014). In the Senate
Appropriations Committee hearing on July 10, this was pointed out by Senator Johanns, who
mentions that smugglers are telling parents that the US government will let children stay in the
US, and that to some extent they are correct due to the 2008 trafficking law which, it is assumed,
decreases the chances of children being deported since they are able to more easily evade
immigration proceedings once they are released (Senate Appropriations 2014, 50). This
illustrates how the system itself was also viewed as incentivizing individuals, which was seen as
having an important role in the development of the crisis.
The executive branch also believed that the assumed “benefit” of being released due to
the 2008 trafficking law itself was incentivizing individuals, but it was also seen as an issue of
misinformation by smugglers who were exploiting individuals’ vulnerable situations. Regarding
the 2008 trafficking law, the Obama administration began to ask Congress to provide the “DHS
secretary additional authority to exercise discretion in processing the return and removal of
unaccompanied minor children from non-contiguous countries like Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador…” (Letter President Efforts 2014). The DHS secretary himself also advocated for
increased discretion in the removal process for Central American children in a committee
hearing for the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 10, where he specifically requested to
have the ability to “offer” these children the option of voluntarily returning to their country of
origin (Senate Appropriations 2014, 47). This was because the DHS secretary believed
individuals in the Central American countries needed to see people being deported back to their
countries of origin in order to stop more people from making the journey (Senate Appropriations
2014, 47). These statements illustrate that the executive branch stood in agreement with those
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who believed the main cause of the crisis were issues in immigration enforcement and incentives
being provided either through the administration or by the immigration process.
However, the administration also placed significant weight on misinformation as one of
the main causes of the crisis, particularly misinformation that was spread by migrant smuggling
organizations. For example, in the emergency request for funding that the President sent to
Congress, the administration requested funding to tackle smuggling networks, and in a
subsequent call between the Vice President and Central American governments, the
administration focused on collaboration between governments to fight misinformation
campaigns and prosecute smugglers (Fact Sheet Emergency 2014; Readout Biden Call Central
American Presidents 2014). Furthermore, in a statement by the President on immigration
released on July 9, the president stated that “parents who are frightened or are misinformed about
what’s possible are willing to take extraordinary risks on behalf of their kids” (President
Statement Immigration 2014). In these cases, the administration presented the crisis as driven by
a major misinformation campaign which needed to be addressed in order to aid in solving the
crisis. Although, it can be seen through the request in increased discretion around the 2008
trafficking law that the administration also viewed the system of processing children as
supporting these misinformed views to some extent, which is why asking for increased discretion
was a possibility.
With the belief that immigration policies and a lack of enforcement were incentivizing
individuals to arrive to the US, migrants and asylum seekers arriving at the border were not
necessarily viewed as potential refugees who were fleeing dangerous conditions from their home
countries, but were mostly viewed as people being placed in dangerous situations for a chance to
stay in the US. This view was specifically applied to unaccompanied children. In a Senate
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Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing on July 9, one senator stated
that “true compassion really would be to prevent this from happening, to actually attack the root
cause, which… is the incentives we are creating for parents to send their children on this arduous
journey” (Senate Homeland Security 2014, 55). In this case, the Senator makes the main issue of
the crisis out to be the dangerous conditions that children are being placed in through the pull
factors that exist, and that a “compassionate” response would include removing the incentives so
that individuals are less likely to make the journey. This is similar to a statement made almost a
month earlier in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on June 11 by Senator Ted Cruz, who
stated “These numbers [presented by the DHS secretary on the number of unaccompanied
children arriving] represent children, little boys and little girls that their parents are handing
over… to international global criminal cartels that smuggle human beings in” (Senate Judiciary
2014, 38). These statements are representative of the view that pull factors are causing a
humanitarian crisis due to the situation that children are being placed in.
It is important to note that although this was the main view of politicians who believed
that perceived incentives drove individuals to migrate to the US, there were also some politicians
that viewed the children arriving at the border as potential “threats.” In a House Judiciary
Committee hearing on June 25, a Congressman stated the following: “So if I am under 14 and I
say I am under 14 and I look under 14, and I am a gang member that has been deported, you
don’t know that, because you are not taking his fingerprints” (House Judiciary June 2014, 146).
Since Border Patrol does not take biometric information from children under 14, but the children
are still able to be released during their immigration proceedings, the Congressman argued that
anyone who “appeared” to be under the age of 14 could be let in to the country even if they were
not a young child or could be a criminal, which could pose a threat to American citizens (House
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Judiciary June 2014, 146). This view of the migrants and asylum seekers arriving at the border as
potential public safety “threats” also appeared in the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee hearing on July 9, where a senator stressed that a “juvenile”
can be as equally dangerous as an adult, and that the US needed to be more careful with newly
arrived undocumented migrants (Senate Homeland Security 2014, 45). This view of migrants as
potential “threats” raises important implications for how to deal with the crisis, specifically
contributing to the idea that increased border security and strict immigration enforcement in this
instance is vital for national security because they would stop “dangerous” individuals from
arriving.
Although the view of migrants and asylum seekers, particularly children, as being placed
in dangerous and vulnerable positions on the journey to the US due to the perceived pull factors
driving the crisis was more common, both ways of viewing the migrants when focusing on the
pull factors led to similar definitions of deterrence. For the politicians who viewed the lack of
immigration enforcement, misinformation, and incentives within the system as the main causes
of the crisis, a deterrence response was understood to mean strict enforcement policies and
fast-tracked deportations of people arriving at the border in order to send a message to others to
not migrate to the US (Senate Judiciary 2014, 24; House Foreign Affairs 2014, pgs. 6, 36-37;
House Judiciary June 2014, pgs. 11, 130-131; House Homeland Security 2014, pgs. 6, 18, 22-23,
33, 85; Senate Homeland Security 2014, pgs. 10, 28, 312; Senate Appropriations 2014, pgs.
12-13, 40-41, 50; Senate Foreign Affairs 2014, 43-44; House Judiciary July 2014, pgs. 5-6, 30;
Press Briefing June 20 2014; Press Briefing July 3 2014; Press Briefing July 10 2014; Press
Briefing July 31 2014). In the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on June 25, the Chair of
the committee stated “we have got to take immediate steps to send those children to their country
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of origin to be reunited with their families. Failure to act quickly and return these kids is going to
cause even more children to risk the perilous trip north” (House Foreign Affairs 2014, 6). In this
statement, one can see how, in viewing the crisis as placing children in dangerous situations
rather than as a crisis driven by the Central American countries’ conditions, the end goal of
potential policy initiatives becomes finding ways to deter individuals from migrating as soon as
possible. For the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the repatriation of
unaccompanied children to their countries of origin would be a quick and efficient way to
disincentivize individuals who are thinking of migrating, or sending their children to the US,
because they would see that no benefits would come out of it (House Foreign Affairs 2014, 6).
The view espoused by the Chair of the committee is further supported by another
committee member later on in the same House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing. During the
question and answer portion of the hearing, Congressman Duffy argues against the idea that the
individuals making the decision to migrate, and for their children to migrate, do not know that
the trip is dangerous or are misinformed about the journey, which is an argument made by the
Obama administration regarding what was causing the crisis (House Foreign Affairs 2014, 36).
The Congressman believes that people do know how dangerous the journey is, and the only way
to stop people from taking the risk is to send a strong message that the US will not accept the
children in the country (House Foreign Affairs 2014, 36). By deporting children back to their
countries of origin, the trip will be deemed “useless” and people will not put their lives at risk, or
the lives of their children (House Foreign Affairs 2014, 36). This view of deterrence is defined
by its short-term response and the potential benefits that the children, their families, and the US
receive out of stopping people from attempting to reach the US-Mexico border.
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The executive branch defines deterrence in a similar way, but placed greater emphasis on
migrants and asylum seekers being misinformed about US immigration policies. For example, in
a press briefing on June 20, the press secretary emphasized that individuals should not be
considering making the journey to the US because, even if it does appear in the short-term that
individuals can stay, once a case is determined the individual will most likely be deported (Press
Briefing June 20 2014). The press secretary went on to mention that it is necessary to build the
capacity of procedural facilities so that the case determination process can go through more
quickly (Press Briefing June 20 2014). Here, the secretary illustrates the view of the executive
branch that most individuals coming to the US during the crisis were not refugees, and had no
valid protection claims. Also, they display the importance of fast-tracking deportations in
combating what is perceived to be a misguided view of the immigration system. Deterrence is
thus defined by its ability to send a clear message to migrants to not arrive to the US, and in its
ability to stop individuals from making a dangerous journey, especially if the decision is based
on misinformation. This is further supported by the press secretary stating the following in a
press briefing on July 3 regarding the need to resolve cases and repatriate children more quickly:
“It sends a clear and unmistakable signal to a parent who might be considering putting their
children in the hands of a stranger… if they get to the border that they’ll be allowed to remain in
the country. That is simply not the case” (Press Briefing July 3 2014).
However, as insinuated by the press secretary in the June 20 briefing, misinformation was
also assumed to play a key role in pulling migrants and asylum seekers to migrate to the US,
which also defines deterrence in the context of combating misinformation. In multiple press
statements released by the executive branch, it was reiterated that children and families who
arrived at the border during this crisis would not qualify for DACA or for a new immigration
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reform bill being discussed in Congress during 2014 (Readout Pena Nieto June 2014; Readout
Vice President Honduras 2014; Press Call 2014; Readout Pena Nieto July 2014). With these
statements, it is assumed that individuals were at least partially motivated to migrate to the US
because they falsely believed that they, or their children, would qualify for immigration reform
or the increased discretion guidelines regarding relief from removal in the immigration process
that the Obama administration was implementing at the time. These assumptions ended up
shaping a core response from the executive branch, which was to fight against misinformation
through public information campaigns throughout the Central American countries and fighting
smugglers, who were deemed to be spreading misinformation on US immigration policies (Fact
Sheet Children 2014; Press Call 2014; Readout Vice President Minors 2014; Letter President
Efforts 2014; Readout Biden Call Central American Presidents 2014; Readout Pena Nieto July
2014; Fact Sheet Molina 2014). For the executive branch, deterrence as a short-term response
also meant fighting against what they viewed as mass misinformation in the Central American
countries which incentivized people to migrate. In doing so, this form of deterrence would allow
for the US to further “promote safe, legal and orderly migration” (Fact Sheet Molina 2014).
When looking more closely at these conceptions of deterrence, particularly within
Congress, one can begin to see how deterrence in terms of mass deportations and strict
immigration enforcement can also be understood as humanitarian responses, which blurs the
distinction between deterrence and humanitarian frameworks. In the first part of the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs committee hearing held on July 9, Senator
Johnson stated early on in the question and answer portion of the hearing that “I cannot think of a
more humane thing to do, even though it maybe sounds a little cruel, than to deter parents from
sending their children to the United States, and I cannot think of a better way… as to literally
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take these minors… and return them to the country of origin...” (Senate Homeland Security
2014, 33). The Senator acknowledged that the mass deportation of children sounds cruel and
inhumane, but he argued that it is actually a humane response because it would stop parents from
pushing their children to make the dangerous journey to the US.
Later on in the same hearing on July 9, Senator Johnson goes on to state the following:
“I mean, we are a compassionate society. We understand these are children. We want to show true
compassion. I think the point that a lot of us are making here today is true compassion really
would be to prevent this from happening, to actually attack the root cause, which I will restate
again is the incentives we are creating for parents to send their children on this arduous journey…
As nice as those posters look like [talking about the administration's public information
campaigns in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador], they will do nothing, nothing in
comparison to what planeload after planeload of children being returned to their families… would
do. That is the most important thing we could do to deter parents from doing this to their
children” (Senate Homeland Security 2014, 55-56).

Senator Johnson’s statement represents the idea that deterrence policies can convey true
“compassion” by disincentivizing individuals from putting their children in danger. Here,
deportation of children is seen as a humanitarian response as well to the crisis, because it would
theoretically be resolving the issue of children risking their lives on a journey to the US.
Humanitarianism is thus conceptualized as a way to minimize the risks of children, and to some
extent of families as well, in attempting to reach the US with the idea that they can stay in the
country.
A humanitarian response, then, does not necessarily mean following international
guidelines from the perspective of politicians who view pull factors as the main causes for the
crisis, but rather it is understood as finding ways to treat children well and fulfill the US’s
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obligation to treat the people arriving with “compassion.” In a Senate Appropriations Committee
hearing on July 10, Senator Coats prepared and submitted an opening statement in which he
states the following:
“It is our responsibility as a nation and a compassionate society to care for the hurt and displaced,
but we cannot simply open our arms and encourage all the world’s children to strike out on their
own, face endless dangers, and come to our shores… Our country should continue to meet the
needs of children who have been sent here… Given how rapidly this situation is escalating, the
United States has a moral responsibility to swiftly solve this crisis. This situation involves more
than just unaccompanied minors. We cannot ignore the national security implications of a weak
border” (2014, 13).

The senator’s statement illustrates how meeting the needs of children and deterring people from
making the journey was viewed as an obligation for the country, and as a humane response to the
issues being faced while also considering the US’s own national security interests. Mass
deportation can then be seen as a humanitarian policy response, since it would allow for the US
to fulfill its moral and national obligations in “caring” for children by preventing their migration.
Overall, humanitarianism can be understood as inherent in deterrence policies based on the
humane goal of preventing future harm, which deterrence can ideally achieve in a short period of
time.
This understanding of deterrence and humanitarianism was further supported by
Congressmembers who assumed the main cause of the crisis were pull factors by attempting to
discredit the idea that the Central American countries’ conditions were the main cause of the
crisis. In a House Judiciary Committee hearing on June 25, a representative tried to show that the
conditions that unaccompanied children were fleeing in their home countries were not as
dangerous or deadly as it had been made out to be by stating that the Detroit homicide rate was
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almost the same as the homicide rates seen in the Central American countries (House Judiciary
June 2014, 156). In that same hearing, another representative also tried to illustrate in their line
of questioning towards a witness that the conditions in the Central American countries had not
changed enough to push individuals to migrate to the US, and that what had changed was the
belief that people could stay in the US (House Judiciary June 2014, 235). The representative also
stated that “If we start enforcing the law today, I will submit to you that we can save children.
You won’t see those dead bodies, you won’t see these girls that are getting raped, and you won’t
see these children that are getting abused by these criminal gangs” (House Judiciary June 2014,
235). This statement represents the view that deterrence is humanitarian, since strict enforcement
of immigration law can “ideally” have positive implications for the lives of children and families
risking their lives in hopes of staying in the US (House Judiciary June 2014, 235). This also
supports the idea that the migrants and asylum seekers were not potential refugees, which also
allowed for politicians to ignore international obligations a nation has towards refugees and led
to a different view of humanitarianism.
Although the executive branch did advocate for greater immigration enforcement and
fast-tracked deportations based on its view of migrants and asylum seekers as being incentivized
to make the journey to the US, it is also important to note that the administration was very much
concerned with finding a balance between those deterrent policies and treating children
humanely. In a fact sheet on unaccompanied children published on June 20, the administration
stated that “Our first priority is to manage the urgent humanitarian situation by making sure these
children are housed, fed, and receive any necessary medical treatment” (Fact Sheet Children
2014). They also go on to discuss their plans for increased enforcement, including speeding up
immigration proceedings to remove individuals more quickly if they do not qualify for protection
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(Fact Sheet Children 2014). For the executive branch, a humanitarian response was understood
as focusing on the needs of children and families in custody, which could coexist with their
deterrence response of increased enforcement.
For the administration, finding a “middle ground” between these two frameworks was
very important, and was emphasized in multiple briefings and statements released throughout the
duration of the crisis (Fact Sheet Children 2014; Press Call 2014; Letter President Efforts 2014;
Letter Supplemental 2014; President Statement Immigration 2014; Fact Sheet Molina 2014;
Press Briefing June 20 2014). For example, in a published letter from the President, he stated the
following:
“My administration continues to address this urgent humanitarian situation with an aggressive,
unified, and coordinated Federal response on both sides of the border… This includes fulfilling
our legal and moral obligation to make sure we appropriately care for unaccompanied children
who are apprehended, while taking aggressive steps to surge resources to our Southwest border to
deter both adults and children from this dangerous journey, increase capacity for enforcement and
removal proceedings, and quickly return unlawful migrants to their home countries” (Letter
President Efforts 2014).

The administration tried to balance what it perceived to be its humanitarian obligations of
treating children well, while also making sure it was able to limit the number of people making
the journey to the US through a deterrence response which had humanitarian implications in the
sense that it would stop individuals from making a dangerous journey. This need for balance
could be due to the fact that the President had to navigate and respond to constituents and groups
with differing views. As can be seen in this analysis, there were very different views around how
the crisis should be handled, and to what extent deterrence and humanitarianism could support
each other and coexist based on how the terms were defined.
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Conclusion
All in all, in analyzing the discourses around the 2014 migrant crisis within the legislative
and executive branches, one can see how deterrence and humanitarianism were defined based on
politicians’ understandings of what motivated migrants and asylum seekers to arrive at the
US-Mexico border at that time and how the migrants themselves were viewed. The discourses
also highlighted how deterrence and humanitarianism can be defined in ways that allow for these
frameworks to coexist and mutually support one another. For those who viewed the countries’
conditions (push factors) as the main motivators for migration, they understood deterrence as a
long-term process directed towards improving conditions in Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras, while humanitarianism was understood to be the US fulfilling its national and
international obligations towards asylum seekers by securing fair access to the refugee status
determination process. However, as the crisis continued, fair access to the system was also seen
as a potential deterrent by allowing for individuals who did not qualify for protection to be
deported more quickly. These politicians were also more likely to view the migrants as potential
refugees.
For politicians who viewed incentives in the immigration system, the Obama
administration’s immigration policies (e.g. DACA), and overall misinformation on the
immigration process (pull factors) as the main motivators for migration, they understood
deterrence and humanitarianism as disincentivizing individuals from making the dangerous
journey to the US through strict immigration enforcement and mass, fast-tracked deportations of
migrants and asylum seekers. These politicians were more likely to view the migrants as
vulnerable individuals who were incentivized to make the journey to the US, and in some cases
were viewed as national security threats. The executive branch in particular seemed to try to find

48

a balance between how deterrence and humanitarianism were defined based on these two main
viewpoints on those frameworks. The different ways that deterrence and humanitarianism were
defined, along with the varying degrees to which the frameworks overlapped or led to the same
policy initiatives, illustrates the importance of understanding how nations define and understand
frameworks that shape their responses to issues of international concern, and how they
understand terms that are used by the international community. Specifically, humanitarianism in
the context of responding to refugee crises cannot be assumed to have the same meaning across
nations, as can be seen with the 2014 migrant crisis. Humanitarianism can be defined in ways
that allow for a nation to continue implementing policies that emphasize border security, strict
immigration enforcement, and mass deportation of individuals who could have valid claims for
protection.
There are some limitations to this paper that need to be addressed. Regarding the
methodology, this paper specifically focused on an analysis of committee hearings that addressed
the 2014 migrant crisis to represent discourses in the legislative branch. However, the discourses
within the committee hearings might not be completely representative of the views held by every
politician within the Senate and the House. Further analysis of House and Senate floor debates
on proposed legislation on the crisis, and statements released by Congressmembers on the issue
could give further insight into the different ways that deterrence and humanitarianism were
defined by politicians during this time. Also, the ways in which the crisis, deterrence, and
humanitarianism were understood by the public at large and by interest groups dedicated to the
issue of immigration and refugee politics were not included in this analysis. This paper is thus
not representative of the different public discourses that can shape national understandings of
frameworks that influence national responses to issues of international concern. However, this
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paper still contributes to a better understanding of how a nation defines and understands terms
and principles that impact their responses to issues of international concern, like refugee and
asylum policy, by focusing specifically on the ways in which the government subfield defines
and understands those terms, which has great implications for policymaking on the issue due to
the power the state holds.
The ways that deterrence and humanitarianism were defined and understood during the
2014 migrant crisis can also help us better understand future issues connected to migrants and
asylum seekers arriving at the border from Central America, and political responses to those
issues. Since the initial record number of unaccompanied children that was set during the 2014
migrant crisis, there have been several instances throughout the following years of a large
number of unaccompanied children and families arriving at the border, illustrating that the 2014
crisis was the beginning of a visible issue that the US is still struggling to address today. For
example, in Fiscal Year 2016 (October 2015 to March 2016), “The number of family
apprehensions [was] more than double that of the previous year. The number of apprehensions of
unaccompanied children shot up by 78%” (Krogstad 2016). Also, there was a significant amount
of media and public attention directed towards the migrant “caravans” under the Trump
administration, which included families, women, and girls joining in mass to make the journey to
the US and many with the intention of seeking asylum (Lind 2018). The Biden administration is
currently responding to a large number of unaccompanied children encountered at the border,
with the highest monthly number ever recorded of unaccompanied children being reached in
March 2021 (Spagat and Jaffe 2021).
The current rise in unaccompanied children at the border, and politicians’ responses to
the issue are reminiscent of some of the discourses found within the 2014 migrant crisis. Due to
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processing delays caused by the large number of unaccompanied children arriving, there have
been reports that Border Patrol began to release migrant families without an immigration court
date, and have directed them to a US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office within
60 days of being released (Spagat and Jaffe 2021). HHS has also struggled in placing children in
more suitable and comfortable conditions while waiting for their immigration court date (Spagat
and Jaffe 2021). These delays have led to criticism from different sectors of the US public, with
the governors from the states of Texas and Arizona writing an opinion piece in the Washington
Post titled “The border crisis in our states was created by the Biden administration” (Abbott and
Ducey 2021). The governors go on to describe the perceived threat that the rise in
unaccompanied children and families pose to border security (Abbott and Ducey 2021). The
view of unaccompanied children as threats to US national security, and their migration as being
due to incentives that were created by the Biden administration, is almost the same argument
made by individuals who believed the Obama administration’s policies were to blame for the
2014 migrant crisis. This shows how the understandings developed during the 2014 crisis are
still very much present in discourses around perceived migrant “crises.”
With the current crisis, it will be interesting to see whether similar policy initiatives are
proposed as well, and whether deterrence and humanitarianism continue to be conceptualized in
similar ways that allow for them to mutually support each other and/or coexist. However, it is
also important to understand the perspectives of the individuals fleeing their countries of origin.
In the 2014 UNHCR study Children on the Run, there were multiple statements from children
included in the publication. One child, a 17 year-old from El Salvador, stated the following in his
interview:
“I left because I had problems with the gangs. They hung out by a field that I had to pass to get to
school. They said if I didn’t join them, they would kill me. I have many friends who were killed
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or disappeared because they refused to join the gang… The more they saw me refusing to join,
the more they started threatening me and telling me they would kill me if I didn’t. They beat me
up fives times for refusing to help them. The pain from the beatings was so bad, I couldn’t even
stand up… I went to the police twice to report the threats. They told me that they would do
something; but when I saw that they weren’t doing anything to help, I knew I had to leave. I even
brought a copy of the police report I made; but U.S. immigration took it from me and threw it
away. They said that it wasn’t going to help me in this country” (UNHCR Children 2014).

As policy initiatives continue to be promoted throughout the current situation, it is important to
center the experiences of the individuals migrating to the US, and understand the potentially
deadly consequences of the policies being implemented by the US government. Specifically, in
thinking about deterrence as “humane” due to the view that it could stop individuals from
making a dangerous journey, we also need to be mindful about what situations we are deporting
individuals back to, and the complexities of people’s decisions to migrate. If we ignore the
voices of migrants and asylum seekers when attempting to address these issues, their lives could
be placed in danger.
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